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The presidential election of 2016 proved to be a challenging one for Republican candidates. At 
the top of their ticket was Donald J. Trump, a polarizing presidential candidate whose popularity 
with his base was only rivaled by his unpopularity with his opposition. Trump was quickly 
known for his divisive rhetoric on race, policy, and foreign relations. His rhetoric grew so 
problematic, that candidates running for other offices faced a difficult decision in which Trump 
forced many Republicans to think long and hard about the extent to which they embrace, eschew, 
or remain ambiguous with respect to their party’s standard holder.  
 Comparing Trump to his predecessor, anecdotal evidence from 2008 suggests that 
presidential coattails for newly elected presidents are indeed real. After all, the case could be 
made that then-Senator Obama helped elect eight new senators. Scholarly work also legitimizes 
the idea of presidential coattails. In their seminal work examining presidential coattails and their 
effect on Senate elections, Campbell and Sumners (1990) find that between 1972 and 1988, 
presidential coattails have a modest effect on Senate elections in which a ten-percentage-point 
gain in a party's presidential vote in the state adds approximately two percent to the Senate 
candidate's vote total. The logic here, of course, is that popular presidential candidates turn out 
voters who are likely to vote for the candidate’s co-partisans down the ballot (Stewart 1987).  
Still, Trump presents a unique situation. An unconventional Republican, Trump was not 
well liked by much of the Republican establishment. As such, the logic of a popular presidential 
candidate turning out voters does not necessarily apply—or at the very least, candidates cannot 
rely on this as a means to reelection. That is to say, given his unpredictable campaign, 
Republican Senate candidates were likely pessimistic about their outlook towards Trump's 
coattails.   So what is the optimal strategy for the Republican Senate candidate?   
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In this article, we argue that state politics determines the optimal strategy for candidates who are 
saddled with a controversial presidential candidate. Indeed, based on our findings, voters reward 
candidates at varying levels for taking these positions. Specifically, the disloyal strategy worked 
best in swing states and amongst Democrats, liberals, and Clinton voters. The ambiguous 
strategy was less effective, but still received gains in appeal amongst independents and liberals.  
While previous research examines the effects of candidate issue position taking, the 
effects of position-taking vis-à-vis presidential standard bearers, common in this digital and 
media age, is unknown.  We then draw on previous work in social psychology to develop our 
hypothesis on candidate position-taking vis-à-vis co-partisan presidential candidates. Using a 
series of survey experiments to test the effects of candidate position-taking vis-à-vis Republican 
presidential nominee Donald Trump in the run-up to the 2016 campaign, we find that the least 
optimal strategy is to be disloyal or take a position against one’s presidential nominee.  
Moreover, we find that while being ambiguous may help in certain contexts, our survey data 
suggests that the optimal strategy is to remain loyal until the end.  We end by discussing our 
implications and avenues for future research. 
 
Presidential Coattails and Strategy on Presidential Candidates  
The scholarly literature on candidate positioning suggests that there is logic and perhaps an 
optimal strategy for Republican candidates in this situation. For example, Tomz and Van 
Houweling (2008) find that voters often vote based on the candidate’s ideological proximity to 
them and as such, candidates have an incentive to position themselves closest to their 
constituents’ feelings towards the candidate. Indeed, if a voter examines a candidate based on 
their position on Trump, it could serve as a proxy for the candidate’s ideological placement. As 
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such, senators representing blue states should position themselves in a disloyal way so as to 
appear to reject Trump while red state senators should embrace him and appear loyal to the 
presidential nominee. Still, what happens when states lack a clear opinion on the president, a la 
swing states? Bishin (2008) argues that rather than focusing on the median voter, legislators 
should focus on the most active sub-constituency as it relates to partisanship. For example, if the 
base is lukewarm to Trump but there is an active and vocal sub-constituency that opposes 
Trump, the senator should choose to oppose Trump.    
 Even still, there remains an option beyond the cut and dry options of opposing or 
embracing Trump: offering only ambiguous positions. This option is not without its benefits. 
Voters may view the ambiguity through the lens of their own biases and assume that the 
ambiguous candidate sides with them (Irwin 1953; Krosnick 2002; Rosenhan and Messick 1996; 
Tomz and Van Howeling 2009). Still, others find that ambiguity may lead voters to believe that 
the candidate is “evasive or spineless” (Campbell 1983). Furthermore, even disloyalty to the 
party’s presidential candidate can come with costs. Indeed, while disloyalty may appease angry 
opposition voters, it does little to excite the base of voters that are supportive of the president and 
may even go as far as to turn them off of the candidate. We seek to shed light the discrepancy on 
the optimal strategy in this unique case in which Republican Senate candidates were forced to 
take a position on their party’s controversial presidential candidate.  
 
Data and Methods 
To examine which strategy, loyalty, ambiguity, or disloyalty, plays best for Senate candidates, 
we conducted an original online Mechanical Turk survey experiment in the Summer of 2016. 
The experiment used participants recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service and 
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referred to our Qualtrics based survey instrument. We restricted participants to those only with 
U.S. IP addresses. Participants received $.50 to take the survey which lasted, on average 8-10 
minutes. In total, we recruited 1,373 participants.1  
 Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of three visual positioning prompts. 
The first group was shown a Republican candidate embracing Trump (i.e. the “loyal candidate” 
treatment) opposed by a standard Democratic candidate opposing Trump (N=423). The second 
group was shown a Republican candidate taking an ambiguous position on Trump (i.e. the 
“ambiguous candidate” treatment) opposed by a standard Democratic candidate who opposed 
Trump (N=483). Finally, the third group was shown a Republican candidate taking a position 
against Trump (i.e. the “disloyal candidate” treatment) opposed by a standard Democrat (467). 
Appendix A illustrates the images that were shown to each group.2  
 Each participant in each group was then asked the same questions measuring candidate 
preference, affect, and excitement. To measure candidate preference, participants were asked, 
“Which candidate do you prefer?” (the options were the Democratic Candidate or the Republican 
candidate). Candidate preference helps us identify how voters might use proximity to gauge each 
candidate, though it is difficult to see voters changing their candidate preference simply based on 
one heuristic. As a result, we also ask participants to answer the following question to measure 
candidate affect:   
Based on this information, we would like you to rate your feelings towards the candidates 
using a scale that we call a feeling thermometer. Ratings between 0-50 indicate that you 
don’t feel favorable toward the person and that you don’t care too much for that person. 
Ratings between 50-100 indicate that you feel warm towards the person and are favorable 
toward them. You would rate them at 50 if you don’t feel particularly cool or warm.  																																																								
1 We note that the use of the Mechanical Turk service to recruit survey experiment participants has come under 
some scrutiny. Still, Berinsky et al. (2012) find that these participants are often more representative of the overall 
population than other means of recruiting participants (i.e. the use of college students, etc.).  
2 We performed manipulation checks by asking participants to separately identify the positions of each candidate 
vis-à-vis Donald Trump. We only present the data for participants who successfully received the manipulation.   
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Participants were then presented with a horizontal scale ranging from zero to one hundred in 
which they pulled a vertical bar to indicate their answer.  
 Lastly, we measure a key aspect of winning elections—turnout. To measure this, we ask 
participants who excited they are to turn out to vote for the Republican. Specifically, they were 
asked, “On a scale from one to ten, where one means that you are not excited at all and ten 
means that you are very excited, how excited are you to vote for the Republican?”  
 We also asked participants to provide responses to a number of socio-political 
demographic questions. Table 1 illustrates the composition for each treatment group.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Each group has an approximately equal number of participants and the randomization process 
has evenly distributed participants to each group based on these demographics.  
 Based on the literature on the topic, we suspect that the three strategies will yield little 
significant effect on the participants’ candidate preference. After all, this is just one heuristic that 
voters may use in determining their vote choice. Furthermore, the proximity hypothesis argues 
that voters prefer candidates that are closest to their ideological point and as such, we expect that 
Democrats will not be strongly swayed to the disloyal or ambiguous Republicans (Tomz and Van 
Houweling 2008).  
Still, given our more malleable measures such as candidate affect and excitement, we 
may expect to see significant shifts in opinions.  If the proximity thesis is correct, we might 
expect voters that largely disapprove of a president to favor a senate candidate that likewise 
disapproves of the president, the disloyal strategy.  Thus, we might expect Democrats, 
independents, liberals, and moderates who are more likely to disapprove of Trump to report 
“warmer” thermometer scores for the disloyal Republican senate candidate. Conversely, we 
	 6	
might expect Republicans to feel “colder” toward disloyal Republican candidates. Yet still we 
might find that the ambiguous position may appeal to a variety of voters as Krosnick (2002) 
finds that voters place their own biases upon ambiguous candidates, making them more 
appealing (though Campbell (1983) finds that this strategy can also backfire).  
To test these expectations, we examine how participants react to the treatments based on 
their ideology, partisanship, and the type of state that the participants reside in. For ideology, we 
asked participants to rate whether they are liberal, conservative, or moderate. We did clarify if 
the moderates had an ideological lean, and as such, we code moderates as those that self 
identified as truly moderate without an ideological bias. For partisanship, we examine 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. For independents, we again only count those with no 
partisan bias. Finally, we examine participants by the type of state they reside in: blue states, red 
states, and swing states. We operationalize the type of state to include blue states, or states that 
have consistently voted for the Democratic candidate over the last three election cycles prior to 
2016, red states, and swing states, or states that have voted for more than one of the two parties 
over the last three election cycles, or where both parties have been competitive in (e.g. invested 
resources in). See Appendix A for a full typology of states. In the following section, we examine 
this in greater detail.  	
Results 
We present the results in six tables summarizing the results of T-tests analyzing the differences 
in means between the “loyal” or control group, and the two treatment groups (ambiguous and 
disloyal, respectively). Specifically, we look at the results by the participant’s partisanship, 
ideology, the type of state that they reside in, and their 2016 presidential vote choice. We should 
note that their vote choice is based the participant’s answer which was asked prior to the 
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election. It should also be noted that the question was asked before both the James Comey memo 
against Hillary Clinton as well as the Access Hollywood tapes recording Donald Trump. Table 2 
presents the results of the T-tests examining the participants' preferences for the Democrat and 
Republican for the loyal and ambiguous experiment groups. Note that the values represent the 
total percent of participants preferring the Republican candidate in each group.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In terms of party identification, the only group that was significantly different between 
the loyal and ambiguous groups was independents, in which the independents in the ambiguous 
group preferred the ambiguous Republican more than the independents in the loyal group 
preferred the loyal Republican. With regards to ideology, liberals in the ambiguous group 
preferred the Republican marginally more than liberals in the loyal group. Similarly, red state 
voters in the ambiguous group preferred the Republican candidate at a higher rate than red state 
voters in the loyal group. Finally, voters who identified themselves as Trump voters had a higher 
preference for the Republican candidate in the ambiguous group than in the loyal group, though 
again, the difference is marginal and the preference for the Republican in both groups was 
relatively high (87.63 and 95.97 percent, respectively).  
These results suggest that the ambiguous strategy did little to affect voter preference as 
only independents were significantly moved to vote for the Republican when exposed to that 
strategy. While liberals in the ambiguous treatment did prefer the Republican candidate to 
liberals in the loyal treatment, the change was marginal at best, and likely reflects a very small 
shift in vote choice.3 Perhaps most importantly, there are no drawbacks to using this strategy. 
3 We did attempt to see what is driving these results by examining interactions between these 
terms (i.e. Democrats in red states) but given our limitations with regards to the number of 
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That is, Republicans can choose the ambiguous path with no retribution from voters, including 
those that are key to their electoral coalitions. Furthermore, among voters who are already 
inclined to vote for the Republican, specifically red state voters and trump voters, the ambiguous 
strategy has positive effects on candidate preference.  
 Table 3 presents the difference in means between participants in the loyal group and 
participants in the disloyal group. Again, the values represent the total percent of participants 
preferring the Republican candidate in each group.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In terms of the partisanship and ideology of the participant, there were no significant differences 
between the participants of the loyal and disloyal groups. The only difference was for 
participants in swing states in which participants in the disloyal group preferred the Republican 
more than their counterparts in the loyal group. This is interesting as there is little to identify in 
terms of the individual characteristics driving these opinions. That is to say, swing state voters 
are unique and prefer the disloyal Republican. Finally, again, Trump voters in the disloyal group 
preferred the Republican candidate at a slightly higher rate than Trump voters in the loyal group.  
 Looking more specifically at voters within each type of state, we find some nuance for 
what is driving the differences in swing states, though, we are limited by the smaller number of 
observations in these cells. Specifically, we see that in swing states, the higher preferences for 
the disloyal Republican are being driven by independents, Republicans, and conservatives.  
 In sum, it seems that positioning vis-à-vis Trump made little difference as to how 
participants viewed their preference for voting for the two hypothetical candidates. Any changes 
were marginal at best, though two notable findings stand out. First, independents and red state 																																																																																																																																																																																		
observations in each cell, we were unable to identify further what is driving these results. We do, 
however, report the results in the appendix.  
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voters preferred the ambiguous Republican at a higher rate than independents and red state voters 
preferred the loyal Republican.  There were no notable findings for the differences between the 
loyal and disloyal Republican except that swing state voters preferred the disloyal Republican to 
the loyal Republican. This offers some advice to Republican candidates—while they may have 
little hope of shifting allegiances for most voters, swing state voters and independent voters may 
shift their vote preferences based on the candidate’s positioning on Trump.  
 Still, we should not be surprised by the results on the question of vote preference—it 
would be incredibly difficult to get a Democrat or liberal to select a Republican candidate, 
especially when there is the option of selecting an ideologically incongruent to Trump Democrat. 
As with the ambiguous candidate though, the disloyal Republican may not need to fear 
retribution from voters for taking this position. Indeed, none of the groups examined preferred 
the disloyal Republican less than their counterparts who were exposed to the loyal Republican.  
What may provide a better answer as to what effect these positions are taking is the overall 
thermometer score that participants gave the candidates. Table 4 summarizes the difference 
between the participants in the loyal group and the ambiguous group.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Again, we see few significant differences between the participants assigned to the loyal group 
and the ambiguous group. There were no significant differences between the loyal and 
ambiguous group participants by party identification, ideology, or the type of state that they 
reside in. Clinton voters did give a higher average thermometer rating for the ambiguous 
Republican than the loyal Republican. Still, the change was less than five degrees and the end 
result was still only an average thermometer rating of 21.94—well under the neutral score of 
“50.” All this seems to suggest that voters do not view the ambiguous option as a viable means 
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for a candidate to distance herself from Trump. Still, while it may not accomplish the desired 
effects, it does not seem to damage the candidate either.  
 Turning again to the differences between the loyal and disloyal Republicans, the 
differences are starker.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Looking at partisan affiliations, Democrats who were exposed to the disloyal Republican gave a 
thermometer score that was nearly seven points higher than did the Democrats who were 
exposed to the loyal Republican. Similarly, liberals in the disloyal group also rated their 
Republican higher than liberals in the loyal group by nearly the same margin (6.33 points higher 
in this case). Still, while the differences here are relatively large, the value that Democrats and 
liberals give to the disloyal Republican is not encouraging for the strategy. Indeed, Democrats 
scored the disloyal Republican at an average score of 24.79 while liberals scored the disloyal 
Republican at an average score of 24.74, well below the neutral score of “50,” suggesting that 
while the disloyal Republican is preferred to the loyal Republican, the difference does not yield 
electoral benefits.  
 There is one interesting finding that could suggest electoral benefits for some 
Republicans, however. Swing state voters in the disloyal group rated their Republican 9.31 
degrees higher than swing state voters in the loyal group. Perhaps more importantly, the average 
rating for the disloyal Republican was 42.79. This seems to be driven by independents in swing 
states who rated the disloyal Republican nearly 13 points higher than independents in swing 
states rated the loyal Republican. While this value is still relatively low, it does suggest that 
swing state voters can be moved to become more amenable to the Republican candidate.  
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 As mentioned earlier, the excitement to vote for a candidate can provide a proxy for 
turnout, a crucial aspect of electoral outcomes. Table Six describes the differences in the average 
excitement to vote for the Republican candidate for the loyal and ambiguous groups.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As with the previous analyses between these two groups, there are few significant differences 
between the loyal and ambiguous groups. Indeed the only difference that is statistically worth 
mentioning is amongst Clinton voters. Clinton voters in the ambiguous group were on average 
.41 points more excited than Clinton voters in the loyal group to vote for the Republican 
candidate. Still, the overall value was 1.38 suggesting little evidence that Clinton voters would 
have turned out for the ambiguous Republican (The rating is based on a scale from 0-10).  
 There were, however, more differences in strength and quantity between the loyal and disloyal 
groups. Table Seven lists these differences.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In terms of partisanship, only Democrats showed any difference between the loyal and disloyal 
Republicans in that Democrats exposed to the disloyal Republican expressed an average 
excitement score that was .63 points higher than Democrats exposed to the loyal Republican. 
Similarly, liberals in the disloyal group also expressed a higher excitement score on average than 
liberals in the loyal group by a margin of .35 points. Still, perhaps most interestingly, 
conservatives in the disloyal group also expressed a higher excitement score to vote for the 
Republican than conservatives in the loyal group by a margin of .71 points.  
 Even still, swing state voters demonstrated the largest difference as swing state voters 
were 1.13 points more excited to vote for the Republican in the disloyal group than swing state 
voters in the loyal group. While the value remains relatively low at 3.59, such a seismic shift 
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suggests potential that the Republican candidate can gain ground with voters in swing states. 
Again, it seems that independents and Republicans are driving this in swing states as each group 
rated the disloyal Republican higher than their counterparts did the loyal Republican (1.49 and 
1.43, respectively). Most importantly for the candidate, the strategy does not seem to have a 
downside as no group “punished” the Republican for taking the disloyal position to Trump.  
   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have sought to offer an early analysis on how candidates can use positioning to 
distance himself or herself from an unpopular presidential candidate. While we find that neither 
ambiguity nor outright disloyalty work to distance the candidate completely from the presidential 
candidate, they do yield positive effects.  
 The ambiguity strategy is the weakest alternative to the loyal strategy, though it does 
yield some positive differences. Specifically, independents preferred the ambiguous Republican 
slightly to the loyal Republican in terms of candidate preference, as did liberals. The disloyal 
strategy was most effective amongst swing state voters, an effect that is likely being driven by 
independents and Republicans in these states who prefer a candidate that is willing to stand up to 
unpopular candidate given the unique ideological status of their state. Perhaps most important 
amongst all of this is that the strategy did not backfire significantly with any major group. That 
is, in terms of partisanship, ideology, and the type of state the participants resided in, no major 
group preferred the loyal Republican to the ambiguous or disloyal Republican with regards to 
preference, thermometer score, or excitement to vote for the candidate.  
 Indeed, even looking forward, the mix of 2018 Republican senators that were 
once favored for reelection are publically struggling to respond appropriately to Trump. Some 
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such as Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona have decided to openly repudiate the words and actions of 
the President. In his 2017 book, The Conscience of a Conservative, he described Trump’s actions 
as, “Reckless, outrageous, and undignified behavior has become excused and countenanced as 
telling it like it is when it is actually just reckless, outrageous, and undignified. And when such 
behavior emanates from the top of our government, it is something else. It is dangerous to a 
democracy.”  Flake has since declared that he is not seeking reelection.  
 Some like Alabama senate Republican candidate Roy Moore decided to pledge 
their undivided loyalty to Trump.  Moore would continually talk about his affinity to Trump and 
how he would go to Washington D.C. to fight for Trump’s agenda.  In fact, a personal run-in 
with President Trump on Obamacare repeal convinced Nevada Senator Dean Heller to play the 
quiet game by avoiding the media and refusing to weigh in on Trump. The wide variation in 
response to Trump, however, suggests politicians have no idea which of the three strategies are 
optimal.  
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Tables  
Table 1: Description of Distribution of Socio-Political Variables 
Description of Variables 
 Trump Ambiguous Trump Disloyal Trump Loyal 
Percent Male 43.04 43.1 42.65 
Percent White 76.81 78.37 77.54 
Percent Black 7.66 8.57 9.22 
Percent Hispanic 6.42 5.78 5.44 
Percent Asian Am 7.25 5.57 6.15 
Percent Republican 23.41 25.5 22.25 
Percent Democrat 39.61 43.4 42.05 
Percent Independent 33.92 28.41 32.52 
Percent Conservative 29.65 30.31 26.34 
Percent Liberal 44.59 49.34 48.54 
Percent Moderate 25.76 20.35 25.12 
Percent Swing State 26.29 24.2 25.53 
Percent Red State 36.02 41.76 41.61 
Percent Blue State 33.71 33.17 37.11 
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Table	2:		
Differences between Embrace and Ambiguous Groups For Average Candidate Preference  
Numbers Represent Percent of Participants Preferring Republican in Each Group 
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Ambiguous” Group 
Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Party ID     
Democrat 1.16 3.31 .2.15 (172, 181) 
Independent 32.33 41.94 9.61* (133, 155) 
Republican 85.71 91.59 5.98 (91, 107) 
Ideology     
Liberal 2.51 6.31 3.8* (199, 206) 
Moderate 34.95 40.38 5.43 (103, 119) 
Conservative 80.56 84.67 4.11 (108, 137) 
Type of State     
Red State 33.90 44.35 10.45* (118, 124) 
Blue State 28.78 36.96 8.18 (139, 184) 
Swing State 31.48 37.01 5.53 (108, 127) 
2016 Vote Choice     
Trump Voters 87.63 95.97 8.34** (97, 124) 
Clinton Voters 3.59 5.00 1.31 (167, 180) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 																										
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Table	3:		
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Candidate Preference  
Numbers Represent Percent of Participants Preferring Republican in Each Group 
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Eschew” Group Value Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Eschew) 
Party ID     
Democrat 1.16 3.61 2.45 (172, 194) 
Independent 32.33 33.86 1.53 (133, 127) 
Republican 85.71 89.47 3.76 (91, 114) 
Ideology     
Liberal 2.51 4.04 1.53 (199, 223) 
Moderate 34.95 40.22 5.27 (103, 92) 
Conservative 80.56 80.29 -.27 (108, 137) 
Type of State     
Red State 33.90 35.20 1.3 (118, 125) 
Blue State 28.78 25.93 -2.85 (139, 162) 
Swing State 31.48 45.13 13.65** (108, 113) 
2016 Vote Choice     
Trump Voters 87.63 94.83 7.2* (97, 116) 
Clinton Voters 3.59 4.62 1.03 (167, 195) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 																												
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Table	4:	
Differences between Embrace and Ambiguous Groups For Average Thermometer Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Ambiguous” Group 
Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Party ID     
Democrat 17.91 20.55 2.64 (172, 181) 
Independent 31.87 34.34 2.47 (133, 155) 
Republican 70.04 69.00 -1.04 (91, 107) 
Ideology     
Liberal 18.39 20.05 1.66 (199, 206) 
Moderate 36.76 36.84 .08 (103, 119) 
Conservative 60.63 61.56 .93 (108, 137) 
Type of State     
Red State 35.60 41.25 5.65 (118, 124) 
Blue State 34.91 34.27 -.64 (139, 184) 
Swing State 33.48 37.50 4.02 (108, 127) 
2016 Vote Choice     
Trump Voters 70.15 65.62 4.53 (97, 124) 
Clinton Voters 17.46 21.94 4.47** (167, 180) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 																												
	 18	
Table	5:	
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Thermometer Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Eschew” Group Value Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Eschew) 
Party ID     
Democrat 17.91 24.79 6.88*** (172, 194) 
Independent 31.88 33.61 1.73 (133, 127) 
Republican 70.04 71.82 1.78 (91, 114) 
Ideology     
Liberal 18.39 24.74 6.35*** (199, 233) 
Moderate 36.76 37.53 .77 (103, 92) 
Conservative 60.63 63.52 2.89 (108, 137) 
Type of State     
Red State 35.60 41.86 6.26 (118, 125) 
Blue State 34.91 34.95 .04 (139, 162) 
Swing State 33.48 42.79 9.31** (108, 113) 
2016 Vote Choice     
Trump Voters 70.15 70.82 .67 (97, 116) 
Clinton Voters 17.46 26.39 8.93*** (167, 195) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 																												
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Table	6:	
Differences between Embrace and Ambiguous Groups For Average Excitement Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Ambiguous” Group 
Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Party ID     
Democrat .98 1.20 .22 (172, 181) 
Independent 2.30 2.43 .13 (133, 155) 
Republican 6.21 6.31 .1 (91, 107) 
Ideology     
Liberal 1.13 1.15 .02 (199, 206) 
Moderate 2.86 2.59 -.27 (103, 119) 
Conservative 5.05 5.37 .32 (108, 137) 
Type of State     
Red State 2.89 3.36 .47 (118, 124) 
Blue State 2.59 2.5 -.09 (139, 184) 
Swing State 2.46 2.80 .34 (108, 127) 
2016 Vote Choice     
Trump Voters 6.41 6.24 .17 (97, 124) 
Clinton Voters .97 1.38 .41** (167, 180) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 																												
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Table	7:		
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Excitement Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Eschew” Group Value Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Eschew) 
Party ID     
Democrat .98 1.61 .63*** (172, 194) 
Independent 2.30 2.47 .17 (133, 127) 
Republican 6.21 6.57 .37 (91, 114) 
Ideology     
Liberal 1.13 1.48 .35* (199, 233) 
Moderate 2.86 2.97 .11 (103, 92) 
Conservative 5.05 5.76 .71* (108, 137) 
Type of State     
Red State 2.89 3.28 .39 (118, 125) 
Blue State 2.59 2.60 .01 (139, 162) 
Swing State 2.46 3.59 1.13*** (108, 113) 
2016 Vote Choice     
Trump Voters 6.41 6.72 .31 (97, 116) 
Clinton Voters .97 1.65 .68*** (167, 195) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 										
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Appendix A 
Appendix B: Typology of States 
Blue States CA, CT, DE, HI, IL, NJ, NM, NY,MA, MI, 
MN, OR, RI, VT, WA, WI 
Red States AL, AK, AR, AZ, GA, ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, 
MS, MO, MT, NV, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WV, 
WY 
Swing States CO, FL, IA, NH, NV, NC, OH, PA, VA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 22	
Appendix B 	
Differences between Embrace and Ambiguous Groups For Average Candidate Preference  
Numbers Represent Percent of Participants Preferring Republican in Each Group 
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Ambiguous” Group 
Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Interactions     
Democrats in Red States 2.27 4.76 2.49 (44, 42) 
Independents in Red States 34.15 31.25 -2.9 (41, 32) 
Republicans in Red States 88.46 97.37 8.91 (26, 38) 
Liberals in Red States 1.96 7.41 5.45 (51, 54) 
Moderates in Red States 41.38 42.86 1.48 (29, 21) 
Conservatives in Red States 84.38 90.91 6.53 (32, 44) 
Democrats in Swing States 0.00 4.17 4.17 (43, 48) 
Independents in Swing States 30.30 37.21 6.91 (33, 43) 
Republicans in Swing States 81.48 90.0 8.52 (27, 30) 
Liberals in Swing States 1.85 5.88 4.03 (54, 51) 
Moderates in Swing States 45.45 43.90 -1.55 (22, 41) 
Conservatives in Swing States 76.67 78.57 1.9 (30, 28) 
Democrats in Blue States 0.00 2.94 2.94 (59, 68) 
Independents in Blue States 37.21 48.48 11.27 (43, 66) 
Republicans in Blue States 88.89 84.85 -4.04 (27, 33) 
Liberals in Blue States 3.12 5.33 2.21 (64, 75) 
Moderates in Blue States 31.71 39.22 7.51 (41, 51) 
Conservatives in Blue States 77.42 79.63 2.21 (31, 54) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
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Appendix C 
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Candidate Preference  
Numbers Represent Percent of Participants Preferring Republican in Each Group 
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Eschew”  
Group Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Interactions     
Democrats in Red States 2.27 3.92 1.65 (44, 51) 
Independents in Red States 34.15 34.38 .23 (41, 32) 
Republicans in Red States 88.46 84.85 -3.61 (26, 33) 
Liberals in Red States 1.96 1.82 -.14 (51, 55) 
Moderates in Red States 41.38 33.33 -8.05 (29, 24) 
Conservatives in Red States 84.38 82.50 -1.88 (32, 40) 
Democrats in Swing States 0.00 2.13 2.13 (43, 47) 
Independents in Swing States 30.30 62.96 32.66** (33, 27) 
Republicans in Swing States 81.48 100.0 18.52** (27, 32) 
Liberals in Swing States 1.85 6.12 4.27 (54, 49) 
Moderates in Swing States 45.45 55.00 9.55 (22, 20) 
Conservatives in Swing States 76.67 91.89 15.22* (30, 37) 
Democrats in Blue States 0.00 2.86 2.86 (59, 70) 
Independents in Blue States 37.21 18.37 -18.84* (43, 49) 
Republicans in Blue States 88.89 83.87 -5.02 (27, 31) 
Liberals in Blue States 3.12 4.35 1.23 (64, 92) 
Moderates in Blue States 31.71 34.48 2.77 (41, 29) 
Conservatives in Blue States 77.42 70.00 -7.42 (31, 40) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
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Appendix D 
Differences between Embrace and Ambiguous Groups For Average Thermometer Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Ambiguous” Group 
Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Interactions     
Democrats in Red States 18.89 24.71 5.82 (44, 42) 
Independents in Red States 31.27 33.66 2.39 (41, 32) 
Republicans in Red States 67.62 66.55 -1.07 (26, 38) 
Liberals in Red States 20.88 24.57 3.69 (51, 54) 
Moderates in Red States 29.79 40.38 10.59 (29, 21) 
Conservatives in Red States 60.38 61.70 1.32 (32, 44) 
Democrats in Swing States 17.72 18.77 1.05 (43, 48) 
Independents in Swing States 26.94 32.86 5.92 (33, 43) 
Republicans in Swing States 66.14 74.20 8.06 (27, 30) 
Liberals in Swing States 18.39 16.14 -2.25 (54, 51) 
Moderates in Swing States 42.00 44.22 2.22 (22, 41) 
Conservatives in Swing States 56.63 62.82 6.18 (30, 28) 
Democrats in Blue States 16.71 20.21 3.50 (59, 68) 
Independents in Blue States 36.70 33.98 -2.72 (43, 66) 
Republicans in Blue States 77.07 66.45 -10.62* (27, 33) 
Liberals in Blue States 16.95 19.16 2.21 (64, 75) 
Moderates in Blue States 40.00 29.69 -10.31** (41, 51) 
Conservatives in Blue States 65.06 59.87 -5.19 (31, 54) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
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Appendix E 
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Thermometer Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Eschew” Group Value Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Ambiguous) 
Interactions     
Democrats in Red States 18.89 25.78 6.89 (44, 51) 
Independents in Red States 41.27 40.56 9.29 (41, 32) 
Republicans in Red States 67.62 73.18 5.56 (26, 33) 
Liberals in Red States 20.88 28.00 7.12* (51, 55) 
Moderates in Red States 29.79 33.29 3.50 (29, 34) 
Conservatives in Red States 60.38 67.88 7.5 (32, 40) 
Democrats in Swing States 17.72 23.19 5.47 (43, 47) 
Independents in Swing States 26.94 39.56 12.62* (33, 27) 
Republicans in Swing States 66.15 72.5 6.35 (27, 32) 
Liberals in Swing States 18.39 24.94 6.54 (54, 49) 
Moderates in Swing States 42.00 47.05 5.05 (22, 20) 
Conservatives in Swing States 56.63 61.68 5.05 (30, 37) 
Democrats in Blue States 16.71 23.67 6.96* (59, 70) 
Independents in Blue States 36.70 27.12 -9.58* (43, 49) 
Republicans in Blue States 77.07 73.29 -3.78 (27, 31) 
Liberals in Blue States 16.95 22.18 5.23 (64, 92) 
Moderates in Blue States 40 37.03 -2.97 (41, 29) 
Conservatives in Blue States 65.06 62.43 -2.63 (31, 40) 
*P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
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Appendix F 
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Excitement Score  
 “Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Ambiguous” Group 
Value 
Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Eschew) 
Interactions     
Democrats in Red States 1.14 1.57 .43 (44, 42) 
Independents in Red States 2.49 2.40 -.09 (41, 32) 
Republicans in Red States 6.08 6.29 .21 (26, 38) 
Liberals in Red States 1.31 1.52 .21 (51, 54) 
Moderates in Red States 2.62 3.38 .76 (29, 21) 
Conservatives in Red States 5.34 5.61 .27 (32, 44) 
Democrats in Swing States .98 1.08 .1 (43, 48) 
Independents in Swing States 1.70 2.26 .56 (33, 43) 
Republicans in Swing States 5.85 6.5 .65 (27, 30) 
Liberals in Swing States 1.15 .90 -.25 (54, 51) 
Moderates in Swing States 3.45 3.02 -.43 (22, 41) 
Conservatives in Swing States 4.27 5.43 1.16 (30, 28) 
Democrats in Blue States .88 1.18 .30 (59, 68) 
Independents in Blue States 2.74 2.45 -.29 (43, 66) 
Republicans in Blue States 6.70 6.00 -.7 (27, 33) 
Liberals in Blue States 1.06 1.00 -.06 (64, 75) 
Moderates in Blue States 2.88 1.94 -.94* (41, 51) 
Conservatives in Blue States 5.58 5.19 -.39 (31, 54) 
P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
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Appendix G 
Differences between Embrace and Eschew Groups For Average Excitement Score 
“Embrace” 
Group Value 
“Eschew” Group Value Difference Number of 
Observations 
(Embrace, Eschew) 
Interactions 
Democrats in Red States 1.14 1.76 .62* (44, 51) 
Independents in Red States 2.49 2.75 .26 (41, 32) 
Republicans in Red States 6.08 6.60 .52 (26, 33) 
Liberals in Red States 1.31 1.60 .29 (51, 55) 
Moderates in Red States 2.62 2.58 -.04 (29, 24) 
Conservatives in Red States 5.34 6.18 .84 (32, 40) 
Democrats in Swing States .98 1.53 .55 (43, 47) 
Independents in Swing States 1.70 3.19 1.49** (33, 27) 
Republicans in Swing States 5.85 7.28 1.43* (27, 32) 
Liberals in Swing States 1.15 1.51 .36 (54, 49) 
Moderates in Swing States 3.45 4.05 .60 (22, 20 
Conservatives in Swing States 4.27 6.19 1.92** (30, 37) 
Democrats in Blue States .88 1.43 .55* (59, 70) 
Independents in Blue States 2.74 2.04 -.70 (43, 49) 
Republicans in Blue States 6.70 6.42 -.28 (27, 31) 
Liberals in Blue States 1.06 1.34 .28 (64, 92) 
Moderates in Blue States 2.88 2.93 .05 (41, 29) 
Conservatives in Blue States 5.58 5.30 -.28 (31, 40) 
P<.1, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
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